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ABSTRACT 
 
Douglas Billy Michael. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright 
State University, 2018. “Explaining Nuclear Rollback: Examining the 
Cessation of Nuclear Weaponization in Argentina and Brazil from 1964 – 
1994.” 
 
Seventy years after the first use of nuclear weapons in World War II, the 
proliferation of these apocalyptic munitions remains a key policy issue on the 
international stage. The available literature on nuclear proliferation suggests a 
strong correlation between the threat of rival a state seeking nuclear weapons 
and a state’s own decision to pursue its own nuclear weapons. Regional rivals 
Argentina and Brazil both initiated nuclear weapons programs and were also 
developing nuclear delivery systems; however, these countries were able to step 
out of this dyadic proliferation spiral and renounced their nuclear weapons 
programs. Often assumed a success of the burgeoning nonproliferation regime 
embodied by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, some scholars view 
Argentina and Brazil as boldly resistant to the aggressive posture of the extra-
regional regime.  
Which International Relations (IR) theory is best suited to explain the 
proliferation outcomes of Argentina and Brazil? More specifically, were 
Argentina and Brazil’s nuclear proliferation decisions driven more by security, 
norms, or domestic politics? A case study of this dyad will be done using process 
tracing to determine which theory best supports the nuclear re-posturing of each 
country.    
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I. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Since the advent of Nuclear Weapons technology during WWII, some states 
have chosen to acquire nuclear weapons, a subset of these states have eventually 
abandoned the pursuit, while other states have never chosen to initiate the quest.1 The 
overriding motivations for states to acquire nuclear weapons include national security, 
a ticket to major power status, domestic pride, and genuine technological curiosity, 
and while nuclear weapons have perhaps not spread as quickly as some early 
predictions warned, current efforts to provide absolute proliferation control are 
proving unsuccessful (North Korea, India, Pakistan2, and perhaps Iran). The non-
development of nuclear weapons since their inception cannot be explained only by 
material rationalism. Moreover, Realist scholars have repeatedly argued that when one 
state in an adversarial or competitive dyad initiates the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the 
other dyadic state is compelled to do the same or risk loss of power relative to the 
initiating state. How then, can rival states overcome this threat and step out of this 
cycle once the process has begun? 
 
 
                                                     
1 William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatshanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay” 
International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 139-169 
2After withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea publicly announced its 
intention, and subsequently tested a nuclear device in 2006. India and Pakistan have both developed 
nuclear weapons and have remained outside of the NPT.  
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Trends in Nuclear Proliferation 
Nine states are commonly held to have nuclear weapons; however, more could 
acquire them with relative ease. Five of these states are officially recognized as 
possessing nuclear weapons by the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The 
United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France and China;3 four additional states 
are known, or generally considered to possess nuclear weapons: Israel, India, Pakistan, 
and North Korea. For states believed to be in pursuit of nuclear weapons, their citizens 
often bear the burden on those efforts in taxes, sanctions, and sacrificed opportunities 
for economic and educational development. However, the leaders of those pursuant 
states might approach the nuclear calculus from a different perspective. Nuclear 
weapons are said to provide their possessor with a deterrent capability, which 
Schelling has defined as “persuading an enemy that, when he takes our response into 
account, he should prefer to behave in ways we prefer him to behave.”4 Many Realists 
have based proliferation examinations on the premise that the possession of nuclear 
weapons is the natural evolution of a state’s desire for security and balance in an 
anarchic system.5 Waltz has argued that nuclear weapons offer security through 
                                                     
3 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed in 1968, is the most widely 
adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, 
nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing 
nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination 
of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire 
nuclear weapons and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear 
activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All 
states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and should assist one another in its 
development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at 
five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. 
4 Thomas C. Schelling, “The Future of Arms Control” Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 5 (September-
October, 1961), p. 726 
5 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War” International 
Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), pp. 5-56; 
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deterrence at a significantly reduced cost over the continual modernization of a 
conventional military force. He claims that this cost reduction allows resources, which 
would have otherwise been directed to security concerns, to be redirected toward other 
state interests, such as strengthening the economy.6 The stabilizing power of nuclear 
weapons has lead realists to project a world full of nuclear weapons that, at least in 
some regard, has yet come to pass.  Nevertheless, the sheer destructive power of 
nuclear weapons has created global concern over both horizontal proliferations, the 
number of countries (or actors) that have nuclear weapons, and vertical proliferation, 
the number of nuclear warheads each state possesses.7 The result has been states that 
possess nuclear weapons do not want non-nuclear states to pursue the capability, nor 
do non-nuclear states want nuclear states to grow their arsenals.  This research focuses 
on the issue of horizontal proliferation. 
Realism and neo-realism have made great strides in explaining the role of 
external security threats as a primary driver of proliferation,8  but a great deal of this 
analysis has focused only on states that have developed nuclear capabilities. The 
discipline has failed to give proper attention to states that have either abandoned, or 
never initiated the development of nuclear weapons. Cases with variance to the 
                                                     
6 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” International Security, Vol. 
18, No. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 44-79; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz’s The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995) 
7Richard K. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation” Foreign Policy, Vol. 26, No. 4 
(Spring 1977) pp. 157–183. 
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” International Security, Vol. 
18, No. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 44-79; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz’s The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons : A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: 
Instability in Europe after the Cold War” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), pp. 5-
56; Daniel Deudney, "Dividing Realism: Structural Realism and Security Materialism on Nuclear 
Security and Proliferation." Security Studies Volume 2 (Summer 1993), 7-36. 
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dependent variable will identify the antecedent conditions required for the successful 
operation of prevailing proliferation theories. 
Why has the nonproliferation regime failed to thwart nuclear weapons 
proliferation in some states? Are the claimed nonproliferation successes of the regime 
valid? Realists have provided a plausible game-theoretic framework through which we 
may evaluate dyadic proliferation episodes yet the anomalous cases of abandoned 
proliferation are often under analyzed. Waltz9 has demonstrated a strong correlation 
between interstate rivalry and the fulfillment of a nuclear arms race, however, not all 
states that have breached the economic and technological thresholds have chosen to 
produce nuclear weapons. Moreover, some rival states have mastered nuclear 
technology and been to the brink of weaponization, only to step back down. 
 
The Research Question  
Why have rival states with an adequate economic and technological nuclear 
threshold as well as a demonstrated desire to attain nuclear weapons mutually 
abandoned their nuclear pursuits? Which International Relations (IR) theory is best 
suited to explain the proliferation outcomes of Argentina and Brazil? More 
specifically, were Argentina and Brazil’s nuclear proliferation decisions driven more 
by security, norms, or domestic politics?? 
 
                                                     
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better” Adelphi Papers No 171 
(1981) and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science 
Review Vol 84, No. 3 (Fall 1990) pp. 731-745. 
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Sub-questions 
1. Can proliferation be avoided once a state has decided to initiate a 
nuclear weapons development program? 
2. How can the nonproliferation regime effectively deter states who 
have initiated nuclear weapons programs? 
3. Is nuclear non-proliferation a successful stabilizing agent for regional 
adversaries? 
The above research questions will be examined in one case of dyadic 
proliferation: Argentina and Brazil. This study chose Argentina and Brazil to 
determine which international relations theory best supports the eventual nuclear re-
posturing of each country. While most of the literature on case selection has 
emphasized the demand for unbiased, random selection, a clear exception has been 
required for research aimed at identifying the conditions required for theories to 
operate successfully. Steven van Evera has suggested that using Mill’s method of 
difference10, selecting new cases similar to previously tested cases in every way accept 
the value on the dependent variable, is an appropriate methodology for inferring 
antecedent conditions.11 Geddes echoes this claim in that when required, case selection 
based on the dependent variables can “bring to light anomalies that current theories 
cannot accommodate.”12 Brazil and Argentina meet the criteria for case selection in 
that during the time the nuclear policies were being established, the states were rivals 
                                                     
10 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002) 
11 Steven van Evera Guide to Methods for Student of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997) p. 71 
12 Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis 2 (1990), pp.131-150 
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in terms of regional influence and military power, which was further complicated by 
Argentina’s disputes with Great Britain over control of the Falkland Islands. The 
regional rivalry between Argentina and Brazil also follows Waltz’s prediction that 
“new nuclear states may come in hostile pairs and share a common boarder,” 13  as was 
the case with India and Pakistan.  
 
Methodology  
For the purpose of this study, I assume that Argentine and Brazilian nuclear 
policies were shaped primarily by either security concerns, adherence to international 
norms, or domestic political pressure.  For the years covered in this study (1964 – 
1994) regional rivalry drove security concerns, the international community gave birth 
to the non-proliferation regime, and democratic transitions in both states began to 
consolidate.  
For the purpose of this study, I define nuclear proliferation as the possession of 
a weaponized nuclear agent as demonstrated through the testing of such a device, 
and/or as recognized by international consensus.14 The case study method is 
appropriate for this research because it permits an in-depth study of Argentine and 
Brazilian nuclear proliferation decisions which allows for utilization of process-tracing 
to explore possible intervening variables which may affect any correlation between 
independent and dependent variables. Case studies, such as those in this study, are 
                                                     
13 Kenneth N. Waltz (and Scott D. Sagan) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 1995) p. 11 
14 Israel, while never having officially declared itself as such, is an example of the latter. 
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appropriate venues for process tracing interacting variables which are not independent 
of each other.15 The independent variable will be the extent to which leading 
proliferation theories impact proliferation decisions. The dependent variables in this 
case will be the resulting non-proliferation of Argentina and Brazil. This study will 
cover the time period from 1964 to 1994. 1964 was chosen because it is the first 
indication that the Brazilian Military was interested in pursuing a weapons grade 
nuclear capability.16 The study ends in 1994 upon both parties signing the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, which created a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.17 
I hypothesize that one of these three lenses, security, norms, or domestic 
politics best explains the resulting non-proliferation of this rivalrous dyad. Content 
analysis of the evidence will allow for process tracing, providing insight into how 
restrictive variables, or combinations thereof, evolved over the course of the states’ 
proliferation episode, or more appropriately, non-proliferation episode.   
To move beyond the realists’ emphasis on external security threats, I will 
examine the proliferation decisions of Argentina and Brazil to uncover the conditions 
required for each state to abandon their nuclear pursuits and overcome the external 
security threat and abandon the potential regional arms race. Realists’ game theoretic 
                                                     
15 George, Alexander and Bennett, Andrew. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) p 212.  
16 "Airgram from the Embassy of the US in Rio De Janeiro to the Department of State, 'Non-Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy by Brazil'," March 28, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1964-1966. Box 948, FSE 13 Brazil 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/145010  
17 On January 18, 1994, Argentina and Chile, and on May 30, 1994, Brazil, brought into force the 1967 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) for their national 
territories. https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons-
latin-america-tlatelolco-treaty  
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treatment would suggest that once initiated, Brazil and Argentina would not have been 
able to pull themselves out of the dyadic proliferation spiral. While realists pose that 
“Man’s capability for self-destruction cannot be eradicated,” this study will provide a 
better understanding of what Thomas Schelling further claimed were the necessary 
“incentives that minimize recourse to violence.”18 I asses an overemphasis on realists’ 
security drivers has caused the debate on nuclear proliferation to remain 
underdeveloped despite exhaustive efforts at its resolution. By analyzing the paradigm 
that framed the proliferation decisions of states that abandoned nuclear weapons 
pursuits, the literature can move beyond failed predictions of the past. 
Non-proliferation for realists is generally assumed the result of extended 
deterrence, where the weaker non-proliferating state would seek to align itself with a 
nuclear ally. If security drivers shaped proliferation decisions, the evidence would be 
ripe with references to the international security environment, threats from nuclear 
weapons states, threats from the opposite dyadic player, a change in the external threat 
environment, or efforts to secure defense agreements that could provide a nuclear 
umbrella from an ally.19 If the existing or emerging norms shaped these decisions, the 
evidence should indicate sensitivity to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
resulting international nonproliferation regime, behavioral norms against the use and 
subsequent development of nuclear weapons, and an overriding respect for 
                                                     
18 Thomas C. Schelling, “The Future of Arms Control” Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 5 
(September-October, 1961), p. 731 
19 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better” Adelphi Papers No 171 
(1981) and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science 
Review Vol 84, No. 3 (Fall 1990) pp. 731-745; Steven Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the 
Cold War” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990/1991) pp. 7-57; and John J. Mearsheimer, 
“Here We Go Again.” The New York Times, May 17, 1998 
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international partners and international law.20 If domestic politics was the primary 
driver, the evidence should indicate a sensitivity to the political and economic costs of 
a weapons program, democratic consolidation, or perhaps a change in threat 
perception at the individual level of the state’s leadership.21 
 
 Theoretical Explanations of Argentine and Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement 
 Security Norms Domestic Politics 
P
re
se
n
ce
 o
f/
C
o
n
ce
rn
 f
o
r 
International security 
environment 
Adherence/acceptance 
of NNPT 
Economic cost/benefit 
Under nuclear threat Behavioral norms Political cost/benefit 
Under rival threat Nuclear non-use 
Democratic 
consolidation 
Threat Environment shift 
Respect for international 
partners/law 
Domestic organizations 
(Nuclear Energy, 
Military, Trade) 
Nuclear Umbrella 
Fear of opposition/loss 
of prestige 
Domestic players         
(Politicians, Public) 
Table 1. Research Design 
 
I will test each case for the way manner in which each of the aforementioned 
theoretical independent variables were perceived by the policy makers through an 
archival review of literature related to the proliferation policies of each state. The 
available literature consists of treaties, agreements, speeches, statements, and other 
                                                     
20 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of 
the Nuclear Taboo” International Security Vol. 29, No. 3 (2005) pp. 5-49; Peter van Ham Nuclear 
Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies (New York:  Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1994) p. 73; and Jacques E. C. Hymans, 2006. The Psychology of 
Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) 
21 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb” 
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1996/1997) pp. 54-86; and Etel Solingen, “The Political 
Economy of Nuclear Restraint.” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1994) pp. 126-169. 
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available documents of both public and private origins. As Van Evera has also 
identified the need for data richness with regard to case selection,22 Argentina and 
Brazil are valuable candidates. The availability of evidence is likely to be greater for 
Argentina and Brazil given that documents, both public and private, are more readily 
accessible in democracies than in authoritative regimes.23 Examples of relevant 
documentation include the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whereby on 14 February 1967, 
Mexico opened a treaty that would be signed by twenty six Latin American states, as 
well as the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic 
of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.  
No matter what ontological or epistemological grounds with which we 
approach the study proliferation, Thomas Schelling reminds us that “just as the 
absence of war today does not make war impossible tomorrow, total disarmament 
would not make rearmament impossible the next day.”24 While this study will help to 
identify possible antecedent conditions of perception that led to nonproliferation in the 
cases of Argentina and Brazil, further testing of these conditions would be required to 
establish their generalizability. Hymans argues “the way forward for the proliferation 
literature is to further develop theory and to rigorously test any new theoretical 
developments through in-depth process-tracing analysis of an ever more complete 
                                                     
22 Steven van Evera Guide to Methods for Student of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997) p. 79; Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: 
Selection Bias in Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis 2 (1990), pp.131 
23 The availability of information in democracies has been emphasized in the following: Liz Harrop, 
“Propaganda’s War on Human Rights” Peace Review, Vol. 16, Issue 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 311-316; Mira 
T. Sundara Rajan, “The Past and Future of Privacy in Russia” Review of Central and East European 
Law, Vol. 27 Issue 4 (2002) pp.625-638 
24 Thomas C. Schelling, “The Future of Arms Control” Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 5 
(September-October, 1961), p. 722 
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historical record.”25 This study is however a necessary step in attempting to overcome 
the gap left in the discipline by the predominant theories of proliferation behavior. 
 
  
                                                     
25 Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation” The International Studies 
Encyclopedia. (London: Blackwell, 2010), p 5463. 
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II.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Since the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945, scholars and statesmen alike 
have revered nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrence to acts of war or aggression 
against the possessing state. Because some states pursued the bomb, some states have 
not, and all desire policies to influence others’ proliferation decisions, much of the 
nuclear proliferation literature has focused on predicting likely proliferators. However, 
once a proliferation episode has been initiated, what options are available to deter 
those states’ desires and end the chase? Views on who chooses to develop these 
weapons as well as their motivations, incentives and inducements are generally 
divided into those that focus on security drivers, international norms, or domestic 
politics. 
 
Security 
The uncertainty of nuclear weapons development is cloaked in the uncertainty 
of dual-use: the star-like power created in nuclear science can be used just as easily 
used to provide peaceful civilian energy as it can to provide the most destructive force 
known to mankind. When a state begins pursuit of a nuclear capability, the ground is 
ripe for miscalculation and often, proliferation begets proliferation. To predict 
proliferation outcomes, a nuanced game theoretic treatment of the problem of nuclear 
proliferation provides a structure to examine the policies and institutions that may also 
be shaping proliferation decisions. Most proliferation episodes are theorized to emerge 
13  
from the basic structure of the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD): how can self-interested 
competitive actors cooperate when faced with the stakes of a nuclear magnitude? In a 
dyadic proliferation episode, each actor, or state has two choices, develop a nuclear 
weapon, or nonproliferation. Taken together, the dyad can produce four possible 
outcomes which are preferred in the following order: first, the state develops the bomb 
while the other adheres to nonproliferation (PN); second, both state choose 
nonproliferation (NN); third, both develop nuclear weapons (PP); finally, the least 
favorable outcome would be for the state adhere to nonproliferation while the other 
acquire the bomb (NP), as the cost of nuclear retribution would be too high to 
absorb.26  
In an anarchic world, Waltz establishes the theory of rational deterrence with 
regard to nuclear proliferation decisions, whereby states seek to secure their survival 
in a zero-sum game by increasing their power through the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, or by forging an alliance with those already in possession. 27 As nuclear 
proliferation cycle begins to unfold, states respond to the changing international 
security environment and perceived threats from adversarial states, who are either 
developing or in possession of their own nuclear weapons, by pursuing the bomb 
themselves. The Soviet Union acquired nukes to balance against the U.S.; Britain and 
France acquired them to deter the Soviet Union; China developed to deter the U.S. and 
the Soviets; India followed China; Pakistan followed India. For Waltz, the threat of 
                                                     
26 Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April 
1988) pp.317-349.  
27 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better” Adelphi Papers No 171 
(1981) and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science 
Review Vol 84, No. 3 (Fall 1990) pp. 731-745. 
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development from the opposite -dyadic player should be enough to spur nuclear 
weapons development. Non-proliferation for realists is generally assumed the result of 
extended deterrence, where the weaker non-proliferating state would seek to align 
itself with a nuclear ally; those incapable of accomplishing the technical feat pursue an 
alliance with a nuclear state that could extend its “nuclear umbrella.” Furthermore, for 
the realist, the spread of nuclear weapons is not necessarily to be avoided as nuclear 
weapons provide a powerful deterrent effect and serve as a stabilizing agent on the 
international stage. 28, Mearsheimer argues that despite attempts to curtain and rollback 
proliferation, more states will inevitably develop the bomb.29 
T.V. Paul divides proliferation efforts into two camps: great-powers, and non-
great-powers, where the proliferation policies of the latter are “determined largely by 
the level and type of security threats that it faces and the nature of interactions or 
conflict with its key adversaries and allies in its immediate geo-strategic environment. 
However, the nuclear choices of great powers (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the 
United States) are determined chiefly by larger powers’ relations in the international 
system.”30 In failing to clearly define how he judges the status of great powers, Paul 
demonstrates the bias of his “Prudential Realism” and one that appears frequently 
throughout the realists’ attempts to explain nonproliferation. Paul implies by the 
examples given that he considers the possession of nuclear weapons to be a precursor 
to “great power” status. Waltz applies this restriction in his refusal to acknowledge 
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Germany or Japan as great powers in international politics.31 The division of great 
power relations and non-great-power relations based on military strength ignores that 
when ranked on an economic basis there are still members of both great powers and 
non-great-powers that are not following uniform proliferation policy predictions.  
Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States have chosen to develop nuclear 
weapons; however, Germany and Japan have each chosen against proliferation, yet 
each remains a great economic power. Furthermore, Great Britain relies on the United 
States for its nuclear arsenal and the same can be said of the patterns, or lack thereof, 
with respect to non-great-powers. While I do agree with the importance of 
understanding the context and situations in which proliferation decisions are made, I 
do not agree with the dichotomy as established by Paul. The literature unanimously 
points to nuclear weapons possession as an immediate vehicle to great power status. 
However, costly nuclear arms races are often the byproduct for those that embrace the 
bomb and anyone standing as a rival. Proliferation decisions, by all powers great or 
small, will best be understood when considering how a state perceives its interactions 
with its key adversaries and allies in its immediate geo-strategic environment as well 
as its relations in the international system. Again, I believe this is where the 
weaponization norm has skewed the methodology. 
Many scholars argue that realism too often overemphasizes the external 
security drivers and ignores the domestic and international policies that shape states’ 
proliferation policies. Realism predicts a world full of nuclear weapons possessors; 
however, most states have yet to develop a nuclear weapons program and many 
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remain unaligned with those that do wield the capability.  
 
Norms 
With the emergence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, an 
international norm against the development of nuclear weapons began to emerge. 
International dialogue began to shift from the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons to 
a focus on the human cost of nuclear miscalculation. Initially proposed by Ireland and 
Finland, the treaty focuses on non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful 
use of nuclear technology. 
Doyle argues the built-it institutional checks and balances, adherence to the 
rule of law, and an inherent drive to the peaceful resolution of disputes creates a 
“democratic peace” by which democratic dyads are less likely to engage in conflict. 
When extended to nuclear weapons decisions, the same variables should be present.32  
Keohane argues that actors can also set aside their perceived immediate good, 
to achieve a higher corporate good; individual state actors may value certain 
international institutions enough to cooperate with their nonbinding mandates, even if 
they may prefer not to. A concern of retribution, retaliation, or expulsion from the 
whole is the driving force behind most international institution, in general, and the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and resulting international nonproliferation regime 
more specifically. 33 Sagan argues that the NPT not only provides a sense of inclusion, 
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but it is also serves to increase states' confidence about the limits of their potential 
adversaries' nuclear programs and can empower domestic actors who are opposed to 
nuclear weapons development. 34 
Tannenwald challenges the actual value of even developing nuclear weapons 
by examining the Nuclear Taboo and the normative basis of non-use that has emerged 
over the past 6 decades of this class of weapon. Tannenwald argues that in the decades 
following the only use of nuclear weapons in World War II, a behavioral norm has 
emerged against these apocalyptic tools, which serves to delegitimize them as viable 
option of war. 35 While Tannenwald’s argument is centered on the use of nuclear 
weapons, those adhering to these norms would most likely eschew even crossing the 
threshold of development out of respect for international partners, law, fear of 
opposition, or loss of prestige.  
Moving beyond classical constructivism, Hymans approaches the question of 
nuclear proliferation from a political psychology perspective, arguing that the national 
identity conceptions (NICs) of individual leaders at critical times in the evolution of 
nuclear thought has driven the proliferation decisions of most states. Hymans offers 
four lenses through which to examine the states executive decision-maker’s identity: 
oppositional, or "us versus them"; sportsmanlike, "if both we and they are perceived to 
be nested within wider, single 'transcendent' identity groupings" (p. 22); nationalist, a 
feeling of equality or superiority; and subaltern, or subordinate. Hymans argues that 
proliferation will occur when the deciding leader is both oppositional and nationalist, 
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moreover when a leader perceives external hostility coupled with a strong sense of 
equality or superiority.36 However, little attention is given to a stabilizing control to 
account for the constant turnover in leadership within democratic states; as new NICs 
take command, states nuclear policies would seemingly swing wildly and would likely 
eventually trend toward proliferation.  
 
Domestic Politics  
The domestic politics model opens up the automated state decision-making 
responses of realism by emphasizing domestic players with an interest in the outcomes 
of those decisions. A state’s nuclear energy sector, the military, politicians, and the 
public are likely to have interests and opinions on the proliferation policies of the 
state. Nuclear weapons are political tools with economic costs and risks often used to 
advance domestic and bureaucratic interests.  
Organization theory suggests certain bureaucracies may generate environments 
that favor pro-proliferation preferences by exaggerating perceptions of national 
threats, supporting sympathetic politicians, and lobbying for increased defense 
spending. The result would be increased financing and prestige for scientists and state 
laboratories. Solingen further builds upon these institutional determinates by arguing 
that the economic factors often trump any other variables in the proliferation decisions 
of democratic actors. Democratic states interested in proliferation but pursing liberal 
economic policies may determine that the potential damage done to international 
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economic alliances could outweigh the benefits realized from pursuing 
weaponization.37  
Peter van Ham dichotomizes causal proliferation variables into two broad 
categories: those of demand and those of supply. “On the demand side… (1) acute 
threat perceptions; (2) general national security concerns; and (3) political prestige. On 
the supply side, the issue of the availability of sensitive materials, technology, 
equipment, and know-how is of crucial importance.”38 Brazil and Argentina again 
prove compliant with these variables, but as a nuclear pursuing dyad offer needed 
variance to the resulting nuclear nonproliferation.  
In 2004, Singh and Way published a quantitative test of the determinants of 
nuclear proliferation, and found that while the realists’ security argument proved to 
have a great deal of theoretical validity, there was also emphasis given to the 
restrictive powers of economic interdependence and liberalization variables as well.39 
Singh and Way acknowledge that while their qualitative test has given weight to the 
persistence of certain variables in relation to proliferation, there is still a need to 
examine the effects caused by interaction between the causal variables. These 
conditional effects are what I seek to identify in the cases of Brazil and Argentina. 
With regards to Brazil and Argentina, Singh and Way held that both countries 
had achieved the first two “degrees of nuclearness” by demonstrating an interest in 
nuclear weapons and undertaking substantial efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The 
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authors’ model accurately suggested that both states were likely candidates for 
proliferation; however, both eventually abandoned their pursuits before acquiring a 
working device. Traditional proliferation theory, heavily entrenched in game theory, 
suggests that because each state had undertaken a significant commitment towards 
developing a nuclear weapon, each would react by committing even more solemnly to 
attaining a nuclear weapon. The failures to reach the final “degree of nuclearness” 
make this dyad an outlier.  
The proliferation debate has been driven by the concern over who ultimately 
possess nuclear weapons and has largely ignored states that do not.  Brazil and 
Argentina remind us that the possession of dual use nuclear technology does not 
equate the intent to weaponize the material. The rising demand for nuclear energy 
requires the acceptance of such technologies.40 Once again, Germany, Japan, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Australia are examples of these self-restricted regimes. I will test the 
Brazilian and Argentinean cases to identify how the presence of determinants that 
initiated these states nuclear pursuits’ and indicated eventual acquisition of a nuclear 
weapon was likely, failed to produce nuclear weapons.  It is precisely the presence of 
the compounding security threat for Brazil and Argentina as previously tested by 
Singh and Way that makes these two states ideal candidates for this study. For the 
purpose of this study, I will define nuclear proliferation as the possession of a 
weaponized nuclear agent as demonstrated through the testing of such a device, and/or 
as recognized by international consensus.41  
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Tanya Ogilvie-White argues that the epistemological debate over proliferation 
study has led to more skepticism and underdeveloped results than to reliable policy 
prescriptions. In reviewing the approaches that have been used to address the issue of 
proliferation, Ogilvie-White finds that there are contributions and limitations from 
each. While classical realism has been able to explain the importance of security 
considerations, it has ignored domestic determinants and has made inaccurate 
predictions about proliferation behavior. Neo-realism has also produced elegant, 
logically deduced explanations of nuclear proliferation, but has side-stepped the 
empirical difficulties. By ignoring the outliers, it has failed to explain unit level 
outcomes because it has focused on systemic outcomes, therefore its predictions and 
explanations are misleading and inaccurate. Neo-liberal institutionalism has explained 
certain domestic economic and political determinants but left the decision-making 
process out of the analysis. In terms of the structure side of the agent versus structure 
debate, organizational theory has defended the role of organizations in irrational 
behavior and also has focused analysis on the implementation of decisions. However, 
it has also underestimated the impact that individual beliefs can have in changing the 
structure. This has led the agent side of the debate to employ belief systems theory to 
focus on the role of individuals and groups to explain seemingly “irrational,” rational 
decisions. However, Ogilvie-White reminds us that it is difficult to quantify these 
values and has still failed to explain causal mechanisms of beliefs. Analysis of 
learning models have alleviated some of this burden and have helped to explain of 
new information can impact individuals and lead to structural change. Unfortunately, 
it too has lost its predictive power by lacking the ability to explain what lessons are 
22  
likely to be learned under what circumstances. And finally, the social construction of 
technology (SCOT) theory has tried to explain the role of technology by placing 
nuclear proliferation in historical and social contexts, but in doing so has becomes so 
descriptive that the variables required to test such a theory have become 
unmanageable.42 If nothing else, Ogilvie-White at least identifies the complexity with 
which one is confronted when approaching the issue of proliferation and in doing so 
has created a compelling case for pluralism. While a complete evaluation of 
proliferation through each of the aforementioned ontological foundations would be 
well beyond the scope of this project, I will test the Brazilian and Argentinean cases to 
identify which of the leading IR theories is best suited to explain the proliferation 
outcomes of Argentina and Brazil. 
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III. 
 
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
 
 
 
Security, Prestige, and Politics 
Argentina and Brazil are the most nuclear advanced countries in all of Latin 
America, with nuclear programs dating as far back as the 1950s. This chapter presents 
a correlation between the shift to nuclear weaponization between the two states, 
measured by the degree to which each states’ policies were being driven by the fear of 
uncertainty over the opposing state’s policies, a desire to adhere to emerging 
international norms, or simply a factor of domestic politics. An archival review of 
each states nuclear development effort follows.  
 
Argentina: Nuclear Origins 
By the late 1940s, Argentina was the most economically and politically 
powerful country in South America43 and the pursuit of nuclear energy fit well with 
Argentine President Juan D. Peron’s (1946–1955) desire for regional leadership and 
prestige.44 Austrian physicist Ronald Richter fed Peron’s interest by convincing him 
that Argentina could achieve that state of the art in nuclear advances for less than the 
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investments made by the U.S. and the USSR45. Peron subsequently appointed Richter 
as the director of a research facility on Huemul Island and in 1951, Peron announced 
that Richter had produced a controlled thermonuclear fusion reaction. However, 
several leading nuclear physicists disputed the claim, eventually exposing Richter’s 
fraud claim and the Huemul nuclear research facility was dismantled.46 
Despite the setback and international embarrassment, Argentina‘s nuclear 
program was to be undeterred.47 The National Commission for Atomic Energy 
(CNEA), established on 31 May 1950 by President Peron to plan and organize 
national policies and guidelines for scientific and technological development, 
specifically nuclear advancements.48 CNEA initial undertaking was to build technical 
and managerial teams separate from the Argentine government, a nonpartisan 
organization with stability and autonomy.49 CNEA centralized Argentina’s nuclear 
development efforts and between 1950 and 1983, the leadership of CNEA was held by 
the military. However, the military’s grip and influence over Argentine nuclear 
policies began to loosen with the return of democratic rule to Argentina in 1983 and 
the transition to civilian control of CNEA.50  
Argentina and Brazil launched their nuclear programs in the mid-1950s, soon 
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after U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” effort. The U.S. 
effort attempted to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by providing civil nuclear 
energy know-how to be used for peaceful purposes only. Initially, the U.S. provided 
technical information, training, and subsidies to promote nuclear development in 
Argentina and Brazil.51 Through this program, Argentina was able to train 200 
scientists and had built by 1958.52  Brazil too, was able to purchase several research 
reactors – its first one obtained in 1971.53 
Waisman argues the declining standard of living, human rights violations of 
the military, and the defeat of the Argentine military in the Malvinas-Falklands War 
led to an outcry for the end of the military regime in Argentina.54  The violence and 
poorly executed foreign campaigning of the preceding military regime caused it to 
have decreased currency as a political ally. 55 For Argentina, this helped to limit post-
transitional power of the military. Dahl has argued that military and police 
organizations being subject to civilian control are a necessary condition of democracy. 
56 Linz, Stepan, and Aguero argue that because an attempted coup in 1990, 
unsupported by senior level commissioned officers, was thwarted by the president, the 
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democratic regime further legitimized civilian control and helped to galvanize many in 
favor of democracy. 57  Levitsky and Murillo have argued that the Argentine financial 
crisis of 2001-2002 was significant test for the military. Even in an atmosphere of 
chaos, the military accepted its exclusion from regime change. 58  Aguero examines 
the role of civilian and military relations which resulted from the amnesty provisions 
for human rights violations performed by the military regime. He finds that tensions 
were eventually calmed when the amnesty provisions were vetoed and the officers 
were tried. 59  Waisman also suggests that the economic stagnation of the 1980’s in 
Argentina also led to the “formation of a democratic political culture, the commitment 
to democracy of economic and political elites, and strong political leadership.”  60 
Three key factors have motivated Argentina’s nuclear development efforts 
over time, despite the countries revolving leadership: national pride and prestige, self-
sufficiency, and national security. When the Argentine nuclear program began to 
achieve success, it was embraced as a source of pride;61 the nuclear program held 
broad societal support with little opposition.62 Concern over foreign-supplied energy 
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dependencies also fostered a significant nuclear component in Argentina‘s economic 
development strategy.63 Furthermore, Argentina had abundant uranium reserves so 
nuclear development was seen as a way to utilize the countries natural resources to 
develop.64 The highly technical skills required to undergird the nuclear infrastructure 
was also viewed as an advantageous boon to all other sectors of the county’s 
economy.65 
On the national security front, Argentina had limited disputes with its 
neighbors and was not formally engaged in international military disputes, apart from 
the dispute with the UK over the Falklands Islands and a territorial disagreement with 
Chile over Patagonia.66 The invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina, on April 
2nd, 1982 was viewed as a direct assault on British serenity, a nuclear-weapon state. 
Argentina had claimed sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, approximately 300 miles 
east since the early 19th century; however, Britain had held the islands since 1833 and 
rejected Argentina’s claims. The UK initially committed a task force of 28,000 troops 
and over 100 ships, while Argentina had approximately 12,000 conscripted soldiers on 
the Falklands with about 40 ships. The first major conflict occurred on May 2nd, 1982 
with the sinking of the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. Subsequently, the British 
destroyer, HMS Sheffield, was hit and sunk by an Exocet missile. The 74-day war, 
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while muted by some standards, still cost a total of 655 Argentine and 255 British 
lives. 67  
Brazil’s population size, rapid modernization, U.S. alliance, and nuclear 
program evoked concern in Argentine political and military circles. Despite any 
ongoing debates regarding the economic benefits to the development of nuclear 
power, the emergence of the Brazilian nuclear program provided enough instability 
and rationale for Argentina to pursue its own nuclear program, despite the fact that the 
last armed conflict between the two countries had occurred over 100 years prior.68 
Heeding a core tenant of realism, the emergence of the Brazilian nuclear program 
coupled with the regional Argentina-Brazil rivalry provided the spark for the 
Argentines to want to pursue a nuclear program. 
 
Brazil: Nuclear Origins 
Brazilian scientists had begun studying and experimenting with nuclear fission 
by the 1930s; however, it wasn’t until Peron’s Huemul Island claims surfaced in 1951 
that Brazil’s nuclear overtures began to coalesce. In response to Argentina’s 
establishment of CENA, Brazil established the Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas 
(CNP), as a natural research council, and created a nuclear research program under the 
CNP. Shortly thereafter, Brazil‘s President Juscelino Kubitschek established The 
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National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) in 1956.  Brazil possessed an 
abundance of uranium deposits and the most advanced industrial infrastructure in the 
region at that time, making them a prime candidate for nuclear development. By 1959, 
plans were in place to develop a nuclear reactor for electricity. However, despite the 
initial rush to keep par with Argentina, Brazil’s nuclear efforts remained 
underdeveloped until the early 1970s. The Brazilian government purchased a nuclear 
reactor and its associated technology from the U.S. Company Westinghouse in 1972. 
Construction of the 626-megawatt Angra I began soon after at Angra dos Reis. In 
addition to the nuclear reactors, Brazil sought a complete nuclear fuel cycle that 
included uranium enrichment and plutonium recovery technology; however, Brazil 
was not a signatory to the NPT, therefore the U.S. government prohibited any U.S. 
firm from selling nuclear technology to Brazil.69 When the Westinghouse deal fell 
through, Brazil solicited the West German company Kraftwerk Union/Siemens for the 
same capability.70 Brazil‘s 1975 US$10 billion agreement with West Germany 
represented the first sale of a full nuclear fuel cycle and one of the largest transfers of 
nuclear technology to a previously non-nuclear nation.71 The deal provided the 
infrastructure Brazil required to succeed with their nuclear aspirations, providing four 
nuclear 1350 megawatt pressurized water reactors, uranium processing, conversion, 
enrichment, and reprocessing facilities, a uranium prospecting venture; a fuel elements 
production plant, a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, an engineering firm to handle key 
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construction elements, and a plant to manufacture primary components.72 
Analogous to Argentina, the three primary drivers of Brazil’s nuclear 
ambitions were attaining technological self-sufficiency and energy independence, 
prestige, and the progress of Argentina‘s nuclear program. The instability in the 
energy market driven by the oil crisis of 1973 fostered the desire for energy 
independence, as by 1974 80 per cent of Brazilian energy consumption relied on 
expensive foreign oil.73 Brazil invested heavily in hydroelectric power, but soon 
discovered that the energy production capacity would not meet the demand required.74 
The Brazilian government believed that acquiring a nuclear program would grant the 
country international prestige and would boost the country‘s standing within the 
international community, having achieved a crowning technological feat. A Brazilian 
diplomat noted that Brazil “gained new technological and political status on the world 
scene with the nuclear agreement.”75 Furthermore, the Brazilian government was 
concerned with lagging Argentina’s nuclear progress. The West German deal signified 
an ambition and intent to surpass Argentina’s nuclear efforts. Additional, the Brazilian 
government believed that Argentina intended to develop nuclear weapons and were 
convinced that Brazil should follow suit. The Brazilian perception was that Argentina 
felt threatened by Brazil’s size, wealth, and modernization, and would use nuclear 
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weapons to imbalance the power relationship between the two countries.76 These 
factors, coupled with overwhelming regional influence of these two nations, explains 
why their nuclear ambitions and eventual non-weaponization policies matter to the 
international community. Their nuclear rivalry was not an isolated episode, but rather 
the natural evolution of their historical competition for almost two centuries. An 
examination of how Argentina and Brazils nuclear weaponization policies follows.  
 
Nuclear Weaponization Efforts 
The international community widely held that Argentina and Brazil were 
pursuing nuclear weapons programs, which further fostered the paranoia of both 
countries leadership. The countries were regional rivals under predominantly military 
rule and had consistently competed for regional supremacy, despite the fact that the 
last time they had engaged in a bilateral armed conflict was 1825–28.77 Prior to the 
rapid nuclear advancements in the 1970s, both nations had initiated domestic nuclear 
efforts that were not subject to international safeguards. Furthermore, both nations 
rejected the NPT, full-scope IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 
and the Tlatelolco Treaty, refusing to buy in to the evolving international nuclear non-
proliferation regime. Argentina and Brazil constantly maintained a right to conduct 
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peaceful nuclear explosions, refused to submit their sensitive facilities to IAEA 
safeguards, and continually opposed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT, believing 
such agreements violated their national rights and national. All of these factors taken 
together reinforced the notion that each country was intent on acquiring a nuclear 
weapon.78  
Despite the general consensus that Argentina and Brazil were pursuing nuclear 
weapons, both the Argentine and Brazilian governments publicly denied any intention 
to develop a nuclear weapons program. In 1975, General Juan E. Guglialmelli, former 
director of the Argentine Institute of Strategic Studies and International Relations, 
wrote, “Recently both a former foreign minister and the President of the CNEA have 
declared that our country has no intention of building nuclear explosives.”79 Five years 
later, Vice-Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, former President of CNEA, said, 
“Argentina is not even thinking of developing a nuclear explosive…nor does it have 
any intention of developing its nuclear technology for military purposes”.80 After 
announcing that Argentina was capable of producing enriched uranium in 1983, the 
Vice-Admiral also claimed that Argentina would use capability only for “peaceful 
ends.”81 Former Argentine Ambassador to Brazil, Oscar Camilion, stated he never 
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heard any meaningful Argentine official say that the country needed nuclear weapons 
and told the Brazilian press that he had “no doubt of the peaceful intentions of the 
Brazilian program.”82 
Conversely, ministers from the Brazilian military expressed their intent to 
develop nuclear weapons primarily as a symbol for attaining a great-power status. In 
September 1986, former navy minister Admiral Maximiano Fonseca stated “If it was 
up to me to decide, I would make an atomic bomb and detonate it in front of 
international observers to demonstrate the extent of national technical know-how.”83 
Brazil’s Secretary of State for Science and Technology Jose Goldemberg publicly 
stated that he was “convinced that the army would build nuclear explosives and would 
intend them to be nuclear weapons.”84 Indeed, Brazil’s military did have a covert 
parallel nuclear program running alongside the official program.85 However, the true 
nature of this covert effort remains unclear. Some scholars argue that the program was 
an attempt to develop nuclear weapons,86 while others insist the motives were less 
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nefarious.87 Brazilian diplomat Paulo S. Wrobel started,  
It was argued that if the armed forces were so deeply involved in 
nuclear research and development that certainly meant they were not 
interested solely in peaceful purposes. Despite its apparent logic, this 
argument is seriously flawed because it fails to consider the role played 
by the three branches of the armed forces in the development of science 
and technology in Brazil, at both research and production level. For 
historical reasons, the Brazilian military had long been deeply involved 
in the development of many areas of modern science and technology, 
including branches of engineering, telecommunications, nuclear, 
computing and aeronautics. Attributing a weaponry intention to the 
parallel nuclear program simply because it was directed by navy 
officers revealed a lack of understanding of the historical role of the 
military in Brazil‘s technical and scientific development.88 
 
Regional Rivalry and Prestige 
As the preeminent industrial, economic, and military powers in Latin America, 
Argentina and Brazil have long held a rivalrous relationship. Argentina and Brazil‘s 
competition on the nuclear front can be viewed as a modern manifestation of that 
contest. Historically, the rivalry appeared along political and economic fault lines.89 
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Politically, tensions between both countries were cloaked in Peron’s vision of unity 
among Latin America‘s Spanish-speaking populations and in Argentina‘s pursuit of 
regional leadership,90 or a continuation of Spanish-Portuguese competition for the 
domination of Latin America during the colonial period.91 Economically, Argentina 
and Brazil competed for regional raw materials, energy, and markets.92 While not 
overtly military, the potential of military miscalculations grew in the 1960s and 1970s 
as both countries embraced zero-sum realist doctrines.93 Some scholars caution that 
because the relationship was more of a rivalry than acrimonious, neither side ever 
intended an actual nuclear conflict.94 However, many scholars have also argued could 
argue that nuclear doctrine between any nations would deem nuclear conflict 
undesirable, independent of any preexisting relationships. Whoever mastered the 
nuclear fuel cycle first would win; nevertheless, uncertainty remained as to the 
ultimate intentions for the new technology. 
Early in their development, the nuclear programs in both Argentina and Brazil 
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encountered many technical and financial obstacles. The Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG), established after India‘s nuclear test in 1974, sought to ensure that nuclear 
transfers for peaceful purposes would not be diverted to nuclear weapons efforts. 
Argentina and Brazil viewed the NSG as an effort to establish the nuclear-weapon 
haves, and the nuclear-weapon have-nots, creating a nuclear monopoly and 
constraining technological development.95 
 
Treaties, Norms, and Lies  
Since the advent and first use of nuclear weapons technology during WWII, 
global norm regarding the need for nuclear arms control, reduction, and disarmament, 
has emerged. The following examines some of the core pillars of this global non-
proliferation regime, and its role in shaping the proliferation options and decisions of 
Argentina and Brazil. 
 
Treaty of Tlatelolco 
What would eventually become the Treaty of Tlatelolco, originally proposed to 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by Brazil in the early 1960s, sought to 
create a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) throughout Latin America. However, the 
Treaty was fraught with complications from its start. The initial Brazilian proposal 
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was delivered a month before the Cuba crisis. In 1963, the UNGA voted 
overwhelmingly in support of the Latin America NWFZ resolution; however, 
Argentina and Cuba remained skeptical. Furthermore, following the Brazilian military 
coup in April 1964, even Brazilian support of their own effort fell away and both 
Brazil and Argentina began to intentionally delay negotiations. Nevertheless, a 
Preparatory Commission was established by the UNGA which drafted the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco; the treaty opened for signature by early 1967. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was 
the first legally normative base non-proliferation in Latin America and was the first 
NWFZ treaty in the world. The initial effort was difficult because there was no 
template from which to base the work. The treaty formally prohibits production, 
testing, and possession of nuclear weapons within the Latin American and Caribbean 
zone and contained detailed stipulations against possession of nuclear weapons, unlike 
the NPT, which seeks merely to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Argentina and Brazil both took exception to the treaty’s prohibition on 
peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). PNEs were widely held to be an indicator intent 
to build nuclear weapons.96 Some scholars have argued the only difference between a 
PNE and a nuclear weapon is their employment.97 Most parties interpreted the treaty 
to prohibit PNEs, but as the only real nuclear powers in the region, Argentina and 
Brazil insisted on preserving their right to produce nuclear explosive devises for 
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peaceful technological purposes.98 Some leaders in Argentina and Brazil did not want 
to preempt their legal ability to produce nuclear explosive devices defensive purposes, 
should a national security need arise.99 Nevertheless, Argentina and Brazil eventually 
capitulated to the demand in the early 1990s and jointly endorsed a ban on all nuclear 
testing.100  
 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), or 
“Disarmament of the Disarmed” 
“The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is one of the most important 
multilateral accords in history. Though not perfect, it is the cornerstone of the world's 
nuclear non-proliferation regime.”101 BAN Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United 
Nations 
The NPT seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons 
technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to 
further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete 
disarmament. The Treaty entered into force in 1970 for an initial duration of 25 years 
and is reviewed every five years; however, at the NPT Review and Extension 
Conference in 1995, parties adopted the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The NPT 
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stipulates nuclear-weapon countries are not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear 
explosive device to any non-nuclear weapon countries. Furthermore, nuclear countries 
are not to assists non-nuclear countries in the manufacture or acquisition of such 
weapons or devices. Non-nuclear weapon signatories to the NPT agree not to receive 
the transfer of a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device, not to manufacture or 
acquire such weapons or devices, and not to seek or receive assistance developing any 
such weapons or devices. Non-nuclear weapon countries agree to IAEA safeguards on 
all fissionable material.  
As emerging nuclear powers in the 1970s, Argentine and Brazilian leadership 
developed opposition stances to what they viewed as unjust infringements upon their 
sovereign rights. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1978, Argentine Foreign 
Minister Rear Admiral Oscar Montes stated:  
From the beginning, we rejected the NPT because of its discriminatory 
character, since, for the first time in history, it legitimized a division of 
the world into two categories: countries which can do anything as 
regards nuclear affairs and countries which have their rights 
curtailed.102  
The NPT divided the world into two classes: the five recognized nuclear 
weapons states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). NWS had the 
right to possess and produce nuclear weapons without over guidance and to do so in 
large enough quantities to destroy the Earth. NNWS were prevented from obtaining 
nuclear weapons and any domestic peaceful nuclear activities were subject to 
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international scrutiny. Many government officials in both Argentina and Brazil 
believed NWS, or developed states were intentionally attempting to control and deny 
less developed countries the means for economic improvement.103  
Whereas non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal 
concern, measures of disarmament must be consistent with the 
inalienable rights of all states to develop, acquire and use nuclear 
technology according to their priorities, interests and needs, including 
explosions for peaceful purposes.104 
In 1968, Argentine ambassador to the United Nations, Jose Maria Ruda 
remarked  
We realize that it is not easy to find final formulas in the treaty for 
problems that have been under discussion for three years; at the same 
time, however, the major nuclear powers should understand that the 
sacrifice to be made by the non-nuclear weapon countries under the 
system of the treaty is extremely high, without their receiving sufficient 
assurances that would hold out the prospects of a more promising 
future for the maintenance of international peace and security. Despite 
this advance in the field of horizontal non-proliferation, there is no 
indication at this time that would allow us to assume there will be a 
reduction in the arms race among those who possess the most weapons. 
Paradoxically, this treaty is for the disarmament of the disarmed.105 
Brazil developed a similarly irritated position towards the NPT. Brazilian 
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diplomat J.A. de Araujo Castro, in a speech at the Brazilian National War College: 
Brazil has sought to characterize what is now clearly looming as a firm and 
undisguised trend towards the freezing of world power…the main instrument of this 
policy of freezing of World Power…The Treaty (NPT) established distinctive 
categories of nations: one comprising weak and therefore non-adult and non-
responsible countries. Contrary to all historical evidence, the Treaty starts from the 
premise that prudence and moderation are built-in features of power. It 
institutionalizes inequality between nations and apparently accepts the premises that 
the strong countries will become even stronger and the weak will grow even 
weaker.106 
In a 1977, Brazilian President General Ernesto Geisel stated,  
The NPT seeks to legitimize a distribution of power which is 
unacceptable, because it results from the stage at which States found 
themselves at the date of its signature, as regards the application of 
nuclear weapons technology. As a result of this stratification, the 
Treaty requires strict control by the IAEA over the dissemination of the 
peaceful uses of the atom while, in relation to the nuclear weapon 
countries, no barrier is erected to the vertical proliferation of nuclear 
armaments, as evidenced by the growth and sophistication of their 
nuclear weaponry. Additionally, as far as security is concerned, the 
NPT does not provide for any efficient system of protection for non-
nuclear weapon countries…The true sense of non-proliferation is to ban 
the diffusion of nuclear weapons, not the dissemination of nuclear 
technology for the benefit of Man. Given adequate controls, the access 
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to the technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be 
subjected to discriminatory restrictions, whether between nuclear 
weapon and non-nuclear weapon countries or among non-nuclear 
weapon countries themselves.107 
 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(ABACC)  
As the polity of each country began to shift toward democratically elected 
civilian leadership throughout the 1980s, many officials in both countries believed 
bilateral relations and the confidence building measures would be the key to 
overcoming the fear inherent in the game theoretic world of nuclearization. Mutual 
inspections could lay framework for establishing respect and dialogue and would 
eventually brake down suspicions regarding the intentions of secretive nuclear 
programs. As a result, leaders from both states drafted and implemented The 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(ABACC) to establish an understanding on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The 
Agreement was signed at Guadalajara, Mexico on July of 1991. The ABACC is 
responsible for the administration and application of the Common System of 
Accounting and Control (SCCC), which is a full-scope safeguards system applied to 
all nuclear activities covering all nuclear materials in both countries. Brazil and 
Argentina established SCCC to verify that nuclear materials in both countries were not 
used for purposes prohibited by the agreement. The role of ABACC to carry out 
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inspections, designate inspectors, evaluate inspections,  
 
Democratic Transitions 
One of the most significant shifts within the domestic landscapes of both 
Brazil and Argentina during the critical period of nuclearization between the 1970s-
1980s was the democratic transitions of Argentina and Brazil. The transitions of these 
countries have influenced the stability of several Latin American democracies and will 
likely continue to affect the future expansion of democracy and the stability and 
security of the entire region. Therefore, the state, and stability of these polities 
deserves attention, especially as democratic interest groups emerge during the period 
of consolidation with varying views on nuclearization. If democracy is understood as a 
system of government under which the people hold the power, there must be 
“necessary and sufficient conditions in the real world for the existence of such a 
condition.”108  
Robert Dahl offers a thorough definition by outlining eight guarantees required 
for the successful operation of democracy: 1) every member has the right to vote; 2) 
each individual vote carries equal weight; 3) whoever receives the greatest number of 
votes wins; 4) members may vote for whomever they desire; 5) members have 
adequate and equal information pertaining to those who are running; 6) leaders or 
policies with the greatest number of votes displace those with fewer votes; 7) the 
orders of the elected officials are executed; and finally 8) decisions made during the 
                                                     
108 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1956. (Reproduced in The Democracy Sourcebook, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003, p.51) 
44  
inter-election period are either made from the direct expression of the election, or 
made under the preceding seven conditions.109 While both Brazil and Argentina meet 
this criteria, many scholars have argued that each state still falls short of a 
consolidated democracy.  A more qualitative definition would require that democracy 
not only meet the minimalist standards of free and fair elections,110 but also sustain 
competition111 and concessions,112 ensure that the will of the majority is tempered by 
the rights of the minority,113 and hold horizontal and vertical accountability be 
constitutionally institutionalized.114 It is with this qualitative definition that this 
literature review will examine the degree to which the Installation of these two polities 
reflects the values of democracy, and the concerns associated with the Consolidation 
of each regime.  
Democracy, in any state, begins with the installation of a democratically 
elected government. Daniel Philpott traces the roots of Brazil and Argentina’s 
democratic transitions to the Catholic Church’s evolutionary doctrinal embrace of 
social justice for the poor.115 While the Catholic Church undoubtedly played a role in 
the evolution of democratic values in Latin America, successful initiation of 
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democratic transition in Brazil and Argentina was primarily limited by the influence of 
the military. Similarly, the military advocated the development of a nuclear weapon, 
while the Church advocated a sanctity of life that would forbid the use of weapons of 
mass destruction.  
Waisman argues the declining standard of living, human rights violations of 
the military, and the defeat of the Argentine military in the Malvinas-Falklands War 
led to an outcry for the end of the military regime in Argentina.116  The violence and 
poorly executed foreign campaigning of the preceding military regime caused it to 
have decreased currency as a political ally, thereby eroding support for military pet 
projects like nuclear weaponization117 For Argentina, this helped to limit post-
transitional power of the military and dampen the drive for the bomb. Dahl has argued 
that military and police organizations being subject to civilian control are a necessary 
condition of democracy. 118 
In 1983, the new democratically elected president placed Argentina’s nuclear 
program under civilian control and initiated several confidence building measures and 
nuclear cooperation efforts with Brazil, signing five nuclear cooperation agreements. 
In July 1987, President Alfonsin invited President Sarney to tour Argentina’s 
unsafeguarded Pilcaniyeu pilot uranium enrichment facility. In response, Sarney 
invited Alfonsin to tour the Brazilian Navy’s Aramar uranium enrichment facility near 
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Sao Paulo. The significance of the visits was that each facility had served as a secret 
nuclear installation. 
Linz, Stepan, and Aguero argue that because an attempted coup in 1990, 
unsupported by senior level commissioned officers, was thwarted by the president, the 
democratic regime further legitimized civilian control and helped to galvanize many in 
favor of democracy.119 Such a coop, if successful, would have likely threatened the 
fragile binational non-proliferation agreements. Levitsky and Murillo have argued that 
the Argentine financial crisis of 2001-2002 was significant test for the military. Even 
in an atmosphere of chaos, the military accepted its exclusion from regime change.120 
Aguero examines the role of civilian and military relations which resulted from the 
amnesty provisions for human rights violations performed by the military regime. He 
finds that tensions were eventually calmed when the amnesty provisions were vetoed 
and the officers were tried.121 Waisman also suggests that the economic stagnation of 
the 1980’s in Argentina also led to the “formation of a democratic political culture, the 
commitment to democracy of economic and political elites, and strong political 
leadership.”122  
Brazil’s transition away from authoritarian military rule was somewhat softer 
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than Argentina’s. Stepan explores the defense of authoritarian military power 
employed by many Third World armies: arms importation networks must be 
maintained and only the military would have an interest in protecting this interest; 
therefore, the military must maintain the preeminent power. He argues that Brazil’s 
developed arms infrastructure would actually increase the odds of democratic success 
in that as the military is more self-sufficient, the military’s capacity to advance a bid 
for power based on this reasoning is diminished.(84)123  Peeler argues that the 
Brazilian Military gradually embraced the democratic transition as democratic 
discourse began to evolve.124 As there was not as much ill-will between the military 
and civilian spheres as had been present in Argentina, Aguero argues Brazil has in turn 
had a harder time limiting the post-transitional influence of the military.125 As both 
Brazil and Argentina transitioned to democracy from military authoritarianism, fully 
establishing this civilian control has been a major obstacle to consolidation. 
A complete democratic revolution consists of not only the installation of a 
democratically elected government, but also the consolidation of the democratic 
regime. O’Donnell argues that Brazil and Argentina should be classified as 
“delegative democracies” which are “neither consolidated nor institutionalized.”126 
The following section will review the literature surrounding these consolidation 
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challenges.  
Diamond suggests that in order to consolidate the democratic regime: the 
military or other significant actors must be adequately insulated from the political 
process, officeholders must be held horizontally accountable, and that individual and 
group liberties be protected, whether in the majority or the minority.127 Linz and 
Stepan argue that legitimacy is the primary obstacle to Brazil’s democratic 
consolidation because of constraints on Brazil’s first democratically elected 
government imposed by the military hierarchy and extremely high rates of 
socioeconomic inequity.128 Hakim, however, credits Brazils’ leftist leader Lula on his 
ability to enact social reform while empowering democratic institutions.129 Levitsky 
has also applauded the Argentine leadership on the significant advances toward 
alleviating social inequities as well.130  However, Hakim does caution that Argentina’s 
democracy still faces significant challenges to consolidation. After averting a bid for 
President Menum to seek an unconstitutional third term, President De la Rua was 
forced to resign amidst entrenched corruption, politicized courts, and a severe 
economic crisis.131 Even given the current explosion of economic growth in Brazil, the 
benefit to democratic consolidation has yet to be proven. The manner in which this 
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newfound wealth is distributed will have a profound effect on the socio-economic 
stratifications that currently exist within Brazilian culture. 132 
Of Diamond’s conditions, 133 O’Donnell finds the lack of constitutionally 
guaranteed horizontal accountability as the primary reason Brazil and Argentina have 
failed to consolidate.134 Both states, throughout varying and competing democratic 
leadership, have remained in recurring states of economic crisis. Even in during the 
early stages of the Brazilian democratic transition, Lamounier argued the success or 
failure of the transition would depend on the democratic leadership’s ability to relieve 
the severe wealth disparities.135 As such, fiscal reformation has become a central 
tenant of executive policy in both Brazil and Argentina.136 Brazil’s 1988 constitution 
was structured to provide fiscal decentralization, in order to increase the autonomy of 
the states, and a strong president, who was granted the right the issue executive 
decrees with the force of law.137 Sousa warned that the use, or abuse, of executive 
power in this manner would be detrimental to democratic consolidation in that such 
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actions override the legislature and bring chaos to the judiciary; each of which 
undermines the separation of powers.138 While President Cardoso’s goals were “aimed 
at consolidating the mechanisms of representation, strengthening political parties, and 
eliminating distortions,”139 he was in reality weakening horizontal accountability 
through legislating by decree.140 Additionally, the Brazilian government made it clear 
in the 1988 constitution that Brazil would not pursue nuclear weapons, adding a 
constitutional requirement for nuclear development to be “exclusively for peaceful 
purposes”141 and that “all nuclear activity in Brazil would only be allowed for peaceful 
purposes and upon Congressional approval.”142 
Levitsky suggests that while actors are also playing by the democratic rules,143 
the lack of horizontal accountability causes both systems to be highly volatile. 144 
O’Donnell argues that these delegative democracies will remain in a constant state of 
economic crisis until the political leadership takes the responsibility to overcome the 
institutionalization hurdle and promote the establishment of horizontal accountability. 
145 
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Levitsky argues that despite its delegative tendencies, the Argentine 
democracy saw significant advances toward consolidation including the unquestioned 
fairness of elections, broad and consistent protection of political and civil rights, and a 
free media climate.146 Schamis has also suggested that Argentina’s many crises have 
allowed congressional bargaining and accommodation, central tenants of democratic 
consolidation.147 However, Hakim assesses Argentine democracy still faces significant 
challenges to consolidation. 148  After averting a bid for President Menum to seek an 
unconstitutional third term, President De la Rua was forced to resign amidst 
entrenched corruption, politicized courts, and a severe economic crisis. While an 
oppositional force may be capable of winning the presidency of Argentina, (22)149 the 
lack of a significant opposition party to the Peronist in the legislature could cause the 
governance offered by these oppositional leaders to fail,150 further maintaining the 
delegative cycle. 151 
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IV. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE 
  
The goal of this research is the determine the influential significance of each of 
the leading theoretical explanations of nuclear proliferation in shaping the resulting 
non-proliferation of Brazil and Argentina. The following section provides analysis of 
the evidence presented in the preceding chapter, through the lenses of security, norms, 
and domestic politics to provide insight into how each evolved over the course of the 
states’ proliferation episode. Each piece of evidence is evaluated for its presence or 
absence in in the dyad of Argentina and Brazil.  
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Security 
The security approach is a valid and often occurring approach to the 
nonproliferation puzzle, however it is not active in the Argentina and Brazil 
proliferation dyad because the level of animosity between the two rivals doesn’t not 
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meet the threshold at which either felt truly threatened by the other. Nevertheless, the 
tension that remains between Great Britain and Argentina over the disputed territory 
of the Falkland Islands could still be a fault line of future proliferation.  
 
International security environment – No 
The outbreak of the Falklands War is an intriguing piece of evidence on multiple 
levels, the first of which is its impact on the nuclear decision calculus of Argentina. In 
the Falklands War, Argentina found itself in a complex international security 
environment, in direct armed conflict with a nuclear armed rival, without the security 
of a nuclear armed ally. The Falklands War was the only real shift in the international 
security environment that either country faced during this time period, but the conflict 
was short lived and didn’t spur the proliferation spiral feared by some scholars.  
 
Under nuclear threat – No 
Argentina was no doubt aware and concerned about the international security 
environment as evidenced by it voluntarily initiating the war in the first place. The 
threat of Great Britain’s nuclear weapons should have been enough to deter Argentina 
from ever attempting such an invasion, or at the least should have pushed Argentina 
toward a nuclear weapon of its own to counter the British threat, however, nether 
outcome prevailed. While it is likely that some in the military would have considered 
developing a nuclear weapon to counter the British during this time, the limited scope 
of the war would not have allowed a necessary timeline for weapons development.  
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Under rival threat – No 
The ambiguous and rivalrous threat of either Argentina or Brazil developing 
nuclear weapons also did not have the predictive power to result in a proliferation 
outcome either. The view held by some scholars that relations between Argentina and 
Brazil were conflict riddled and overly competitive is not necessarily historically 
accurate. Competition was, has been, and remains present ion the southern cone; 
however, a pattern of cooperation between the two states far predates the nuclear -
issues of the 70s and 80s. Attempts at cooperation we evident as early as1908 when 
Brazilian Foreign Minister Jose da Silva Paranhos negotiated territorial disputes 
peacefully and formally with Argentina’s leadership. By 1914, the ABC Pact 
(Argentina, Brazil and Chile) began to emerge and was formalized on May 15, 1915. 
The ABC Pact (formally the Consultation, Non-Aggression and Arbitration Pact.) was 
designed to develop cooperation, nonaggression, provide for the arbitration of 
disputes, and also gave the three major South American countries a unified means of 
resisting the United States' influence in the region. By 1941, bilateral negotiations 
between Argentina and Brazil had yielded the Agreement for Progressive Free Trade, 
which committed each not to apply trade barriers to activities not yet established in 
either country. During these negotiations Argentina’s Economic Minister Federico 
Pinedo observed:  
I have always understood that it would be ideal to progress towards a 
customs union - open, of course, to other neighboring countries...Let's 
suppose that a policy in this direction would have been initiated many 
years ago. Instead of having Brazil and Argentina run parallel 
industries producing at high costs in different and all but closed 
markets, we could have arrived at a profitable division of industrial 
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work between the two nations...I am prepared to make great efforts in 
order to reach as extensive as possible an understanding with Brazil.152  
 
Threat Environment shift – No 
With only minor territorial disputes with Great Britain and regional 
relationships characterized by cooperation more often than combative, Brazil and 
Argentina saw no real significant shifts in the threat environments during the period.  
There were no other military conflicts that either country was engaged, or likely to 
engage in during the period. The threat environment for both remained mostly static. 
 
Nuclear Umbrella – No 
During the period of analysis, and still today, both Argentina and Brazil remain 
outside the covering of any nuclear security agreements and are not under any nuclear 
umbrella agreement. The United States and some other nuclear powers provide 
military support agreements to partner nations, ensuring strategic stability through 
nuclear backing. The is no nuclear umbrella present in all of South America.  
 
Norms  
The evidence in the preceding chapter clearly demonstrates that the norms 
approach was active in Argentina and Brazil’s proliferation episode through their 
eventual acceptance and adherence to the core ideals and tenants of non-proliferation, 
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but in a few rather unique ways.  
 
Adherence/acceptance of NNPT – Yes, in principle 
First, Argentina and Brazil have both shown a willingness to adhere to the core 
ideal of the NPT as evidenced by their lack of nuclear weapons, however, each were 
reluctant participants in the formal international regimes that had been established by 
the US, British, and other western powers. It wasn’t until regional agreements between 
Argentina and Brazil had been negotiated and came into force that each country was 
willing to formally accept the larger non-proliferation regime. Nevertheless, both 
adhered to the behavioral norms of non-development set out by the regime.  
 
Behavioral norms – Yes  
From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Argentina and Brazil both pursued ambitious 
nuclear energy developments, but did so on occasion under a veil of secrecy by 
refusing to join the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This secrecy led to paranoia, 
miscalculation, and the assumption that both were set on beating the other to the 
bomb; however, this misconception was driven primarily by US projection and other 
western observers but was not necessarily the perception within the dyad itself. 
 
Nuclear non-use – Yes 
Argentina has pursued a nuclear-powered submarine effort with varying 
degrees of zeal over the past few decades but has not shown a desire to actually outfit 
the nuclear-powered vessels with nuclear laden missiles. Due to its natural resources 
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and technical expertise, Brazil has at its disposal the complete nuclear fuel cycle, from 
mineral prospecting to uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication; however, Brazil has 
never developed the bomb, and has shown no intention to enrich uranium to a 
weapons grade level, beyond 20%.  
Further revisiting the Falklands War in light of the nuclear taboo again proves 
revealing. Argentina’s military by 1982 was willing to carry out an invasion of 
territory occupied by a nuclear capable Great Britain. Although Argentina did not 
directly attack Great Britain proper, the British nuclear capability was a factor that the 
Argentina’s military leadership weighted before launching their invasion. Similarly, 
the British were willing to bring nuclear weapons into the theater, albeit never actually 
willing to employ its capability. Argentina’s military leadership believed that the 
British would not respond militarily, with either conventional or nuclear weapons. 
When the British did actually begin conventional attacks, Argentina’s military 
leadership remained convinced that the Great Britain’s nuclear capability would not be 
employed. I asses that this lesson from the British in the non-use of nuclear weapons 
likely served to reinforce the notion that nuclear weapons were not worth the military 
investment for Argentina, as they are rendered useless by the emergence of the nuclear 
taboo.  
 
Respect for international partners/law – Yes  
Both Argentina and Brazil have demonstrated a respect for international 
partners and law but are primarily focused on their immediate regional partnerships 
and have shown to be particularly sensitive to what they interpret as punitive power 
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plays from external international regimes. While shunning the NPT and other 
international non-proliferation efforts in what Argentine ambassador to the United 
Nations, Jose Maria Ruda referred to as the Treaty for the Disarmament of the 
disarmed, Argentina and Brazil sought to establish a Latin American Nuclear Free 
Zone on their own terms, while maintaining their own rights to nuclear energy 
capabilities. The establishment of the bilateral inspection agency ABACC laid the 
groundwork for confidence building between the two rivals, and it also gave both a 
stake in the leadership and success of the overall effort. 
Following the success of the ABACC, both Argentina and Brazil have 
eventually signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), and become members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); 
however, in its 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS), Brazil will not sign any 
additions to the NPT, including the Additional Protocol(IAEA), until the nuclear 
weapon states have made progress towards nuclear disarmament. 
 
Fear of opposition/loss of prestige – Yes  
Argentina and Brazil demonstrated that they were sensitive to opposition on 
the weaponization front and desired to maintain their prestige as the leading countries 
of Latin America, however, their desire for prestige seems to have surpassed just 
merely the acquisition of nuclear weapons, taking a more strategic leadership and 
ownership of their collective region. Argentine and Brazilian leaders rejected the 
notion of external powers setting the rules of the game for South American, instead 
seeking a level of prestige that would allow them to carve our one of the few nuclear 
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weapons free continents in the world. By fully embracing the norm of nuclear 
abstinence, Brazil and Argentina were able to avoid the nuclear arms race that 
bankrupted the Soviet Union and the elusive notion of disarmament with which 
nuclear weapons states continue to struggle.  
 
Domestic Politics  
The evidence in the preceding chapter also supports at least a corollary tie to 
the domestic politics model in shaping the non-proliferation of Argentina and Brazil. 
Both countries weighted and considered nuclear weapons programs for decades, but it 
wasn’t until their respective democracies emerged and began to consolidate that any 
visible commitments to non-proliferation began to emerge. The push for liberalized 
regional trade, which had been present since the early twentieth century, was a greater 
motivator for the players and organizations in both counties. Additionally, the 
perceived power plays of the nuclear haves versus the South American nuclear have 
nots shaped the collective mindsets of players and organizations in both countries. A 
unity between Argentina and Brazil’s leadership, a unity present since the ABC Pact, 
was solidified in both countries resistance to the perception of being bullied. 
 
Economic cost/benefit – Yes  
Nuclear economics played a rather complex role in shaping this specific 
proliferation outcomes. While the direct economic impacts related explicitly to any 
weapons programs seemed to have been of minimal concern to leaders in both 
Argentina and Brazil, the desire to develop and possess nuclear power capability, 
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independent of extra-regional oversight, was driven overwhelmingly by economic 
concerns. Nevertheless, the multiple economic crises in both countries likely served to 
limit the resources available for the military to fully support a costly nuclear weapons 
development effort.  
 
Political cost/benefit – No 
Regional view on the political costs and benefits of nuclear weapons 
development seemed to evolve somewhat homogeneously over time. Leaders early in 
the nuclear age shared initial technological curiosities and sought nuclear power and 
weapons capabilities Nuclear capability obviously appealed to leaders in both 
Argentina and Brazil due to their symbol of great power status and a point of national 
pride. Leaders early in the period were sure to display and tout the nuclear 
advancements that were made by each country. However, the was little evidence that 
leaders were concerned, campaigning, and felt pressure to cave to the nuclear demands 
and certain constituencies.  
 
Democratic consolidation – Yes  
One of the most significant shifts within the domestic landscapes of both 
Brazil and Argentina during the critical period of nuclearization between the 1970s-
1980s was the democratic transitions of Argentina and Brazil. In 1983, the new 
democratically elected president placed Argentina’s nuclear program under civilian 
control and initiated several confidence building measures and nuclear cooperation 
efforts with Brazil, signing five nuclear cooperation agreements. While the military’s 
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commitment to weaponization seems to have always been soft, the transitions to 
civilian leadership in each state paved to way to formalize the end on any nuclear 
weapons ambitions.  
 
Domestic organizations (Nuclear Energy, Military, Trade) – Yes  
Organizationally, by 1983, both the Brazilian Physics Society (SBF) and the 
Argentine Physics Association (AFA) had issued a joint declaration, encouraging both 
governments to exchange nuclear information and to establish mutual inspections of 
nuclear related facilities and agreed to push their respective governments to that 
end.153 For the first time, domestic organizations in both countries had begun to lobby 
for nuclear openness and cooperation. The following year, the same organizations 
issued another joint statement declaring opposition toward nuclear weapons 
development, considering it “morally unacceptable the participation of physicists in 
the development of nuclear weapons.”154 
 
Domestic players (Politicians, Public) – Yes  
The actions of several key domestic players and organizations also facilitated 
the resulting non-proliferation. In 1980, the military governments Argentina and 
Brazil came together for the Cooperative Agreement for the Development and 
Application of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. In 1983, the new democratically 
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elected president placed Argentina’s nuclear program under civilian control and 
initiated several confidence building measures and nuclear cooperation efforts with 
Brazil, signing five nuclear cooperation agreements. The Joint Working Group on 
Nuclear Affairs (JWG) was created in 1985, eventually evolving into the Permanent 
Committee on Nuclear Affairs (PCNA) by 1988. The 1987 nuclear facility visits by 
Argentine President Alfonsin and Brazilian President Sarney was also a significant. In 
addition to the actions of presidential leadership and nuclear physicists, liberalizing 
domestic regimes began to emerge in both states; banks, export firms, and monetary 
agencies for political and economic policies more favorable to trade than to inward 
focused nuclear fiefdoms. 
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V. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
By the 1970s and early 1980s, Brazil and Argentina had acquired and begun 
developing nuclear technology; at the time, neither country was a willing participant 
the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Both countries had devoted decades of 
research and funding into developing their nuclear infrastructures, with a desire to 
become energy independent. Both had achieved a uranium enrichment capability, but 
neither had publicly admitted to a nuclear weapons development effort. Nevertheless, 
the rivalrous relationship and push to advance their influence and power in the region 
made this dyad ripe for miscalculation and a nuclear arms race. Both countries 
viewed one another potential security threat, and their militaries had at least 
considered developing contingency war plans. However, the above process tracing 
reveals that despite the realist’s perilous prediction that a proliferation episode was 
bound to occur, the resulting nuclear weapons never came into being. A causal 
relationship between the security driver and the resulting nuclear weapons alone is 
insufficient. Until the 1980’s, both countries were governed primarily by authoritarian 
military regimes which kept the true nature of any nuclear activities in a veil of 
uncertainty, Furthermore, until the 1980s there was little diplomatic interaction 
between the two sides and little social and economic interdependence However, the 
aforementioned process tracing also reveals common ground between the rivals, 
specifically in their reject of the emerging Non-proliferation regime. Despite Brazil 
initiating the effort, both rejected the limitations on PNEs required by the Treaty of 
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Tlatelolco, both refused to join the NPT due to its discriminatory and imbalanced 
policies.   
On the domestic front, it becomes readily apparent that the same economic 
decline that ushers in a wave of democratic transition in the region, also served to 
limit the allocation of resources to nuclear development and weaponization activities. 
As both countries civilian governments gained support, authority, and stability during 
the 1980s, the military push for nuclear weapons lost its driving voice, both in the 
power of the purse and with the general public. The consolidating civilian led 
democracy was able to approach national security concerns from a perspective less 
influences by the doctrines of military conflict.  Hymans has also identified that P-
residential leadership and identity conceptions during the critical nuclear decision-
making periods of the 1980s and early 1990s, led not only to immediate non-
weaponization, but also laid the cooperative framework from which future 
weaponization episodes could have occurred.  
There is no single factor, nor actor in this particular dyad that led to the 
cessation of the weaponization spiral. Rather, this particular proliferation episode 
seems better characterized by its exceptions and prudential timing of polity shifts. 
The lack of prolonged armed conflict, or the lack of diametrically opposed world 
views, which characterizes most historical arms races, provided a softer soil by which 
cooler heads could blossom. Emerging norms and international regimes served to 
limit access and availability of critical pieces of nuclear technology, but perhaps more 
importantly in this episode, the punitive policies of the international regime actually 
provided common ground by which Argentina and Brazil could open a shared 
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dialogue; the roots of diplomacy, too, began to take hold. Despite general nuclear 
competition throughout the 1960s and 1970s, both states developed a common 
position and hostility towards the international non-proliferation regime. Finally, the 
significant shift from authoritarian military leadership in both countries to 
consolidating, civilian led democratic polities provided the appropriate stable 
architecture by which the states were able retreat from the nuclear brink.  It was in 
this context in which the shared interests between Argentina and Brazil surfaced.  
 
Trust, but Verify 
Negotiations leading to the establishment of the ABACC provided perhaps the 
most significant shift in diplomacy between Argentina and Brazil. The joint disdain 
of the punitive posture of the international non-proliferation regime prompted the 
negotiations and also provided a common point of self-sufficient prime that provided 
the fuel for the 2 countries to overcome their security skepticism and etch out a 
uniquely Latin approach to the proliferation issue. This common position allowed 
both countries to eventually sign and enforce the Treaty of Tlatelolco, renounce their 
rights to conduct PNEs, strengthened their nuclear export controls, created a joint 
system of inspections of all their nuclear facilities that includes accepting full-scope 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, scaled back uranium 
enrichment capabilities, and eventually even adherence as NNWS signatories to the 
NPT.  
Key to the success of nuclear de-escalation between Argentina and Brazil was 
the high degree of bilateral cooperation between the nuclear policies of the two states. 
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Rather than being paralyzed but uncertain security concerns, both countries seized an 
opportunity to improve their security and economy through reducing nuclear 
competition. The shift toward cooperation between the nuclear enterprises of each 
country is still present today.  
 
Outlook 
Some scholars argue that the best theories are those that explain the largest 
number of cases and that the majority of countries that have acquired nuclear 
weapons appear to be best explained by the security model. However, as highlighted 
in the preceding chapters the security model explanation for nuclear proliferation 
decisions is an insufficient causal mechanism to explain the non-weaponization of 
Argentina and Brazil; the problem of nuclear proliferation is driven by more than a 
single universal driver. History provides examples of both successful acquisition of 
nuclear weapons proliferation, abandonment of nuclear pursuits, and altogether 
abstention in the nuclear realm altogether; all decisions being driven by different 
multifaceted casual models. Cooperation was likely possible because Argentine and 
Brazilian security concerns about on another were overwhelming, or fundamental to 
the state’s policies. Therefore, future scholarship in the area of nuclear proliferation 
would likely benefit from a focus on comparative studies seeking to uncover the 
conditions under which specific causal forces produced similar outcomes.  
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